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The Phoenix Risen from the Ashes: Postwar Japan 
by 
Hugh T. Patrick 
In September 1945, and indeed for close to a decade thereafter, no one 
could conceive that by the late 1960 1 s Japan would be not only the strongest 
nation in Asia but the third largest industrial power in the world, and a major 
ally of the United States and its second largest trading partner, after Canada. 
For Japan was utterly defeated in World War II, crushed militarily and econo­
mically, and with its ideological foundations of romantic traditionalism, ex-­
pansionism and nationalism fully discredited. Major citied were in rubble and 
their populations dispersed throughout the countryside. The purpose of this 
essay is to describe Japan's resurgence to the forefront of the world's nations. 
Japan lost in World War II almost three million people, its Empire of 
Taiwan, Korea, Manchuria and various mandated territories and one--quarter of 
its capital stock of machines, equipment, buildings and houses. This included 
virtually all its merchant shipping and textile equipment, the maJor prewar 
industry. Not all was due to the direct destruction of war; in the last des­
perate days textile spindles were taken out of factories and melted down as 
scrap to make munitions. Equipment had deteriorated due to lack of mainten­
ance. Probably more important, soil fertility had declined sharply from the 
virtual cessation of chemical and other fertilizer inputs. Acute shortages 
of goods and bottlenecks, combined with deficit financing and immense bank 
note issue at war-end, were to provide the basis for a rampant inflation that 
was to plague Japan throughout the immediate postwar years. 
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Moreover, Japan was subject to military occupation by the victorious 
Allies, to which the populace initially looked with natural great trepidation. 
As it turned out, the Occupation was perhaps the greatest social experiment 
ever attenpted. Highly idealistic and ambitious, the fundamental objective was 
to recreate Japan as a democratic society---not simply in political and economic 
institutions and in the sources and balances of power, but even in values and 
ideology. For all the inefficiencies, even mistakes, and for all the altera­
tions the Japanese have made since the Occupation ended, any overall assess­
ment must conclude that the Occupation was highly successful. 
This success was possible only because the Japanese wanted it so. Most 
of the seeds of change fell on fertile ground; those that did not have ulti'" 
mately fared :Car less well. It was not simply Japanese cooperation with the 
Occupationaires--though that was essential--because the changes that come about 
have been far too great and lasting for that. Nonetheless, from the Japanese 
point of view the goal was not solely 11 democratization'.•: for most people in 
the irr.mcdiate postwar years the most immediate problem was simply how to sur­
vive, how to meet the pressing material needs for food, clothing, shelter. 
As conditions gradually became better, such economic objectives continued to 
loom large for both individual family and nation. Indeed, the pursuit of 
rapid economic growth and rising living standards has remained predominant in 
Japan's postwar national objectives. And success in the economic sphere has 
been a necessary requisite of Japan's continued democratization and of its re•­
surgence as a world power. Accordingly, this essay focusses mainly on Japan's 
economic performance in arising, like the legendary phoenix, from the ashes 
of World War II. 
I. From Oc~tation to Restoration of Sovereignty. 
The Occupation of Japan was essentially an American operation) even though 
policy was nominally determined by the eleven-power Far Eastern Commission in 
Washington. General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Ailied Powers-­
SCAP, which referred both to MacArthur and to the administrative bureaucracy 
of the Occupation--by dint of personal authority and personality wielded con~ 
siderable decision-making power in addition to overseeing the implementation of 
policy. SCAP worked through the Japanese government using rather than replacing 
it, by means of formal directives and informal, continuous guidance.- Most of 
the SCAP staff was American. They encompassed a wide range of military and 
civilian skills and attitudes and values, from fervent New Dealers to conserva-­
tive businessmen. 
Quite naturally the immediate Occupation objective was to demilitarize 
Japan, first by destroying all armaments, halting all military production, by 
physically taking control of the entire country, by purging military, political~ 
and business leaders, and by punishing those tried and found guilty as war 
criminals. In the longer-run context this was meant to destroy the economic 
and political bases of military strength, and to curtail the willingness to 
use war as an instrument of national policy. A rather considerable punitive 
feeling colored policy at the beginning: Japan deserved its plight, which was 
the outcome of its unpardonable aggression against others; it should be expected 
to pay for the damage it had done. Nonetheless, mere retribution never domi­
nated policy, and soon was submerged in the zeal for reform. The shifting 
policy regarding reparations payments for damage done to Allied nations is 
indicative of changing attitudes. 
The sum of the claims of the Allied nations was huge. It was soon de-­
cided that Japan could not afford payments from current production, but that 
much of her industrial capacity--especially iron and steel, machinery, and 
chemicals-•-was war-related and hence ;;surplus" so that it could be dismantled 
and shipped to damaged neighbors. It was difficult to decide exactly what was 
surplus, since in fact any reduction in capacity slowed Japan's ability to 
support itself economically. At first "surplus 11 was defined as any plant and 
equipment beyond that needed to maintain a standard of living equal to that 
in the countries Japan had occupied; soon this was amended to Japan's prewar 
(1934-36) standard. The United States quickly realized it would ultimately 
have to foot the reparations bill, sending in aid goods as Japan sent repara•­
tions out. The U.S. renounced its claim to reparations and put pressure, not 
entirely successfully, on others to do so as well. The wrangling delayed the 
first shipments of industrial equipment as reparations until 1947, by which 
time a series of U.S. special missions were drastically scaling down this pro­
gram. The cumulative total value of shipments, until the end of the repara­
tions payments under Occupation auspices in 1950, was less than $50 million 
one-~fifteenth of that programmed in 1947. 
A fundamental premise of SCAP was that only if Japan were democratized 
could it become a peaceful, useful member of the world community of nations. 
As a democracy Japan would not want to be aggressive, to wage war; moreover 
democracy was a desired end in itself. Demokurashii soon became a slogan word 
in Japan, with a bewildering variety of connotations to the enthusiastic but 
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often perplexed Japanese man in the street. Was it more democratic for a man 
sitting on a crowded streetcar to offer his seat to a woman, because of the 
raised status of the female, or not to offer his seat on the ground that men 
and women were equally entitled to the seat? 
Nonetheless, the political institutions and behavior of a democratic 
society were obvious enough, and were soon established--institutions first, 
though behavior has not always followed, and certainly not always in the ways 
Americans would expect. Restrictions on political, civil, and religious 
liberties were removed 1 and rights guaranteed. State was separated from the 
Shinto religion. Universal suffrage was extended to women. The system of 
nobility, with aristocratic titles, was eliminated. The Emperor was replaced 
by parliament as the core of the political system; he renounced any claims to 
divinity and was reduced to a (continuingly popular) symbol of state. 
The establishment of parliamentary democracy was an essential feature 
of the entire process. Both the House of Representatives and House of Coun­
cillors were elected; most power resided in the former (the Lower House). 
The country was governed by a prime minister and his cabinet elected by par­
liament (the Diet). Political parties were quickly re-established; they 
covered a spectrum extending all the way to the Japan Communist Party. 
Many of these changes were embodied in the 1947 Constitution, the basic 
law of the nation. This is one of the most idealistic constitutions in the 
world in the political, social, and economic rights it guarantees the citizens 
of Japan. This idealism is manifested also in Article 9 which renounces the 
use of war or the maintenance of armed forces. The sweeping changes embodied 
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in the 1947 Constitution were very much the consequence of American instigation. 
When the rather conservative Japanese Cabinet came up in 1946 with proposals 
for constitutional revision they did not involve significant changes. MacArthur 
then had his staff draw a model document which became the basis of the new Con­
stitution. Despite the awareness by the general public of the American origins 
of their Constitution, it has been and is widely accepted. In recent years 
Conservative elements have urged constitutional amendment mainly to eliminate 
Article 9 and to raise the position (if not the power) of the Emperor somewhat, 
but without success. 
The Constitution is the political and legal manifestation of the changes 
in values and social relations for which SCAP aimed: the replacement of authori­
tarianism and paternalism with equality and individualism. Changes in the 
educational system were also designed to promote new values. The mythology of 
Imperial divinity, coupled with the romantic nationalistic views of the special world 
role of the chosen Japanese people, was denigrated, as were the military. While 
there is less stress to conform than earlier, and some increase in individual-
ism, nonetheless these themes are rather alien to as group-oriented a society 
as Japan's, so that it still remains a collectivistic society. The people con­
tinue to have a highly developed awareness of self and nation as uniquely 
Japanese. When children the world over were asked "what are you? 11 the most 
common response was 11a human being, 11 a "child/1 or a 11boy11 or a 11girl. 71 In 
Japan the overwhelming response was "a Japanese. 11 Yet the primacy of tradi-
tional ideals of loyalty to, and self-sacrifice for, the nation has receded. 
In its place the improvement of material well-being and the enjoyment of life 
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have assumed much greater importance in the goals of most Japanese. 
The democratization efforts involved major economic reforms. It was 
d~emed essential for democracy in Japan to establish a competitive economy with
a more equal distribution of power and a relatively egalitarian, wide distri­
bution of income, wealth, and ownership of the means of production and trade.
Gradually it came to be realized also that these institutional and redistribu­
tive changes were not enough: economic reconstruction and satisfactory econo­
mic growth, resulting in prosperity and rising levels of living, provided the
only economic environment in which incipient democracy could be nurtured 
The approach to building a competitive economy was to break up concen­
trations of economic power by business and landlords, and to develop new 
countervailing power bases among industrial workers, and tenant and other small
fanners. Perhaps the most thorough reform was that of farm land ownership. 
Japan had long been, and still is, a country of intensively cultivated
fmuily farms of miniature (2 1/2 acre average) size, broken down into even 
smaller, non-contiguous, plots. Prior to reform, less than 10 percent of farm
land was in holdings of 125 acres or more. Tenantry was widespread; about 45
percent of the land was farmed by tenants. Two-fifths of the farm families
cmltivated land part of which they owned and part of which they rented, one­
third owned essentially all their own land, while one-quarter were essentially
tenants, cultivating almost solely land rented from others. Landlords, mainly
local residents, were relatively wealthy, powerful, paternalistic, and tra­
ditional. Landlord-tenant problems had become exacerbated during the interwar
period. Land reform programs had been planned, but never implemented, by the 
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Japanese bureaucracy earlier. SCAP thus served as the catalytic agent, rather 
than originating a new idea, while also prompting a stronger reform than other­
wise might have occurred. 
The basic aim was simple: to end tenantry by transfer of land ownership 
to farming tenants from their landlords. The method was land purchase and 
sale, under government auspices, not confiscation. In principle landlords were 
to be fairly compensated: land values were determined on the basis of 1945 
official prices, and payment was partly in cash, partly in low-interest, thirty­
year bonds. Tenant purchasers were extended easy payment terms. By the time 
the actual transactions took place, between 1947 and 1949, inflation had re­
duced the real value of the transaction price to only one percent of prewar 
land prices. 
The land reform virtually eliminated farm tenantry and landlordism. 
Maximum farm size was restricted to 7,5 acres (30 acres in Hokkaido), well 
above the actual average. Change in ownership did not mean much change in the 
organization of production; it remained family farms. The new owners did have 
greater incentive to invest in land improvements~ and in this were much en­
couraged by the relatively high demand and thereby prices for foodstuffs. 
Agriculture was the first sector to achieve prewar living standards and has 
continued to prosper. Consequently, the goal of a sturdy farm family, inde­
pendent of landlord control, has been achieved. Old patterns and values do 
not quickly change however: farmers remain the most conservative political 
force in Japan. 
A second mass base for power to compete against the established power 
of business and government bureaucracy (it being clear that the military were 
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to be eliminated as a power group) were industrial workers. A major objective 
of SCAP policy was to develop a strong, independent trade union movement. The 
pertinent SCAP section was staffed by many American union leaders of very 
liberal persuasion. Even so it is unlikely that they anticipated the rapidity 
and enthusiasm with which unionization swept Japan, or the highly political 
course unionism was to take at the national level. Unions were formed in most 
enterprises of any size. By 1950,56 percent of industrial employees were 
unionized, a high-water level that has receded to about 35 percent,though ab­
solute membership continues to rise. Initially membership included top and 
middle management (after all, that seemed most democratic) but this soon ended 
as unions settled into bargaining with management for employee benefits. Most 
bargaining on economic issues began and has continued to be at the individual 
firm level, so that Japan has been characterized as having enterprise unionism. 
Industry-wide bargaining remains the exception, though national federations of 
unions have increasingly attempted, in annual ii spring offensives, 11 to use lead­
ing industries to establi~h patterns of wage increases which can serve as the 
basis of negotiation by other industries and individual enterprise unions. 
Many individual unions at the firm level joined into industry-wide 
organizations; most of these in turn joined one of several national federations. 
Unionism at the national level has been highly political: they have tended to 
stress political more than economic objectives, have been highly active politi­
cally, and have provided the main support for the moderate--to-extreme left 
political parties. The emphasis on politics was in large part a response to 
the depth and rapidity of economic, political, and social change in postwar 
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Japan. It also reflects the nature of the original (and continuing) union 
leadership at the national level. Most were leftists who had been active in 
the prewar labor movement, had been imprisoned in the late 1930's and early 
1940 1s for refusing to recant and, following Japan's defeat emerged from prison 
as about the only heroic figures around (in both Japanese and American eyes). 
These men quickly took charge of the nascent union movement, and imparted to 
its national organizations the political focus which has been dominant. 
While building a strong union movement and an egalitarian agriculture 
and disbanding the military, SCAP aimed both at reducing the concentration of 
business power and establishing a competitive business environment. The legal 
and institutional arrangements were reasonably clear. What was much more dif­
ficult--and never successfully achieved-- was to obtain widespread Japanese 
business and government bureaucracy acceptance of the concept and ideology of 
free competition as inherently socially beneficial. Most Japanese have never 
accepted the view that the Adam Smithian 11 invisible hand 11 would automatically 
guide the selfish, profit--maximizing behavior of firms and optimizing behavior 
of individuals to the maximum output and lowest prices for the benefit of con­
sumers. Rather, they have historically accepted the 11visible hands" of govern­
ment guidance and of business cooperation (in cartels and otherwise) to attain 
satisfactory economic performance, The Japanese place more emphasis on the 
costs of a competitive system: possible over-capacity and misallocations in 
specific industries, and attendant cyclical fluctuations in business activity. 
They frequently term as "excess competitions" situations which in the United 
States would be regarded simply as intense, but not undesirable, degrees of 
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competition. Because the ideology of free competition has not become ingrained 
in Japan (aside from the issue as to how extensively it is really practiced in 
Western nations), the Occupation reforms in the business sector were eroded 
more than elsewhere in the economy. But this moves us ahead of our story; 
first, the reforms themselves. 
A variety of interrelated reforms were undertaken: dissolution of the 
zaibatsu conglomerates; elimination of cartels and monopolies; brealc-up of ex­
tremely large firms; and enactment of rules of fair play in business. This 
last included anti-trust and anti-monopoly legislation, prohibition of unrea­
sonable restraints on trade, production, sales or pricing, and establishment 
of the Fair Trade Commission to monitor and enforce these rules. 
Zaibatsu dissolution was the most thoroughly implemented and lasting of 
the reforms. The zaibatsu--of which the four largest were Mitsui, Mitsubishi, 
Yasuda, and Sumitomo--were family-owned conglomerates, usually through a hold-­
ing company, of firms operating in mining, manufacturing, commerce, banking, 
and insurance on a highly interrelated basis: buying from, selling to, finan­
cing, insuring, and handling the sales of, each other. They had amassed great 
wealth, economic and political power, and inevitably were completely involved 
in the wartime economy. 
There were two strands in the reform: r8moval of the zaibatsu families 
from ownership, control, or position; and dissolution of the conglomerates. 
The holding companies were ended, and all shares in the underlying companies 
owned by zaibatsu family members were confiscated and sold both to employees 
of the constituent firms (about one-quarter of the shares) and gradually, in 
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the open market, to large numbers of middle-income Japanese. The zaibatsu 
families received in compensation bonds which bore no interest and which could 
not be sold or redeemed for 10 years. All family members were purged, so they 
could not work for the firms they formerly had owned. All this was so effec­
tive that the families have never been able to return to power; by and large 
they have slipped into comfortable obscurity, at least in terms of economic 
and political power if not social status. 
The break-up of the zaibatsu conglomerates was less easy. All inter­
locking directorships and stock-holding came to an end. Subsidiaries and af­
filiates were spun off to be separate, independent companies. A few very large 
zaibatsu firms, particularly the trading companies, were broken down into 
separate companies; for example, Mitsubishi Trading Company was divided into 
about a hundred small trading companies. However, the established buying­
selling-financing-trading patterns remained, so that ex-zaibatsu firms have 
continued to do business with each other extensively. 
Oroginally, zealous to establish a competitive environment (and perhaps 
with punitive motives), SCAP considered some 1,200 operating companies for 
break-up into smaller units. Personnel in the SCAP sections for industry and 
finance had come primarily from American business and banking; they were some­
what less inclined to 11 New Deal 11 measures than their labor counterparts. Prob­
ably more important, it was felt that too much splitting up of Japanese com­
panies would retard economic recovery, and recovery came to be an increasingly 
important objective after the first two years of Occupation. By 1948 the list 
of companies designated for 11reorganization" had shrunk to 325. In fact, only 
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28 companies were ultimately broken up, and 10 of these were in electric power. 
These reforms did much to redistribute income, wealth, and ownership of 
the means of production as well as provide bases of countervailing power in a 
relatively more competitive economy. The wealthy owners of large corporations 
were also hurt by the great corporate losses due to bombing, deterioration, 
reparations and government repudiation (at SCAP insistence) of its guarantees 
on loans made to firms for war production. The tax system was also used to re­
structure the distribution of income and wealth. In 1946 sharply progressive 
special taxes were levied on war profits and on wealth. In 1949 SCAP pushed 
through reforms of the tax system. Much greater emphasis was placed on direct 
taxes, at progressive rates, on personal and corporate incomes, and less on 
sales and other indirect taxes which tended to be regressive. Local govern­
ments were given greater autonomy, including a larger tax base and an automatic 
share in certain taxes collected at the central level. While many of the spe­
cific reforms were weakened, and even the role of direct taxes and of local 
autonomy eroded, in general the new tax system remained even after the Occupa­
tion ended. 
By far the most important, if somewhat erratic and untended, means of 
redistributing income and wealth was inflation. Strong inflationary pressures 
had built up during the war. They were exacerbated by government heavy deficit 
financing and extensive money creation via the Reconstruction Finance Bank, 
which readily made loans to industries essential for reconstruction--coal, fer­
tilizer, electric power, transport, iron and steel--using funds obtained by 
selling its bonds to the Bank of Japan, the central bank. Thus the price level, 
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taken as 1 in 1934-36, was 9 times higher at the end of 1945, 145 times at the 
end of 1947, and about 300 times higher in 1949, when the inflation was finally 
halted as part of the Dodge Plan reforms. Some inflation was inevitable, given 
the exigencies of postwar shortages and bottlenecks. However, a combination of 
wage, price, budget, and bank credit controls could have halted the inflation 
sooner. SCAP at first was unwilling to take responsibility for economic policy, 
and then was slow in developing effective anti-inflationary measures. 
The Japanese government adopted a rather non--cooperative and even decep­
tive attitude toward attempts to halt the inflation. It is probably too extreme 
to say that the Japanese government had a deliberate policy to undermine the 
Occupation reforms, and to shift the burden of support of the economy to the 
United States by making aid imports essential since exports were uncompeti­
tively priced. In large part the Japanese government attitude reflected the 
high priority it attached to economic recovery even at the expense of infla­
tion; it wanted to be sure resources were attracted to essential industries 
and loans seemed the easiest way to accomplish that. Moreover, anti-infla­
tionary measures were bound to hurt, and the party in power would lose popular 
support. Big business had immense wartime loans to repay to banks with the 
government no longer guaranteeing the loans, business benefitted from being 
able to raise the prices of its goods and from repaying the loans with money 
of sharply reduced purchasing power. Business did suffer from sharply reduced 
depreciation charges, in real terms, for its plant and equipment, but this was 
eventually remedied when firms were allowed to increase the book value of 
assets in line with the post-inflation price level. 
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Inflation hurt holders of bonds, deposits, and other fixed-interest 
financial claims, rent recipients, pensioners, and to some extent wage earners 
because of the lagged adjustment of wages to prices in the spiral upwards. 
Particularly hit were agrarian ex-landlords and zaibatsu families, since they 
were stuck with non-saleable bonds whose purchasing power value declined to 
only about five percent of their initial value. In contrast , the ex--tenants 
and other landowners, owners of corporate shares, and owners of other real 
assets did not suffer, and in some cases benefitted, from inflation since the 
prices for their assets increased at least as rapidly as the general price 
level. 
Why did the Japanese accept, or at least tolerate, these striking changes 
in income distribution, ownership of assets, and political power? By and large 
these represented transfers from a small minority to a large majority of the 
Japanese, who quite naturally responded favorably, The previous holders of 
power and wealth were under attack--politically, economically, socially--so 
they were not able to sustain their vested interests. Finally, because Japan 
was utterly defeated and close to chaos, tremendous sacrifices could be de­
manded of everyone simply to get the country back on its feet. 
The assumption underlying initial Allied occupation economic policy was 
that Japan had brought the devastation upon itself, so it had to suffer the 
consequences, and had no right to expect outside assistance in economic re­
covery. In practice however, from the beginning SCAP could not remain com­
pletely aloof of economic reconstruction problems and issues. The difficul­
ties were simply too great, Japan was one of the most devastated of all the 
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World War II countries. Industrial production in 1946 was only one-fifth of 
the wartime peak, and one-third of the 1934-36 level. Agricultural production 
was also off some two-fifths, a less extensive but more serious decline. By 
early 1946 Japan was on the verge of starvation. 
To prevent "disease and unrest 11 General MacArthur prevailed upon Washing­
ton to begin large-scale aid shipments of food and medical supplies. Moreover, 
it was soon apparent that a requisite for successful political democratization 
was an adequate economic base--reconstruction and satisfactory economic pro­
gress. U.S. aid was essential to achieve this. The composition of aid changed 
gradually from food to fertilizer, petroleum, and industrial materials such as 
cotton. By 1949, when the aid program was drawing to a close, the U.S. had 
provided Japan a total of al.most $2 billion in aid. Aid paid for 38 percent of 
Japan's imports during the Occupation--a period when Japan's export earnings 
were negligible because of loss of prewar markets and lack of productive ca­
pacity to produce exports. In per capita terms U.S. aid to Japan was relative­
ly modest: $27 for Japan, as compared with $77 for West Germany, $51 for Italy, 
$122 for the United Kingdom, and $103 for France. Legally this aid was a loan 
rather than a gift, to the eventual surprise of most Japanese and Americans. 
In the late 1950's Japan agreed, based on the formula worked out in similar 
negotiations between the United States and West Germany, to repay the aid at 
the rate of about 25 cents on the dollar. 
SCAP and U.S. concern for economic reconstruction deepened as the world 
environment changed and perceptions altered as to how Japan might best fit into 
it. By 1948 the cold war with Russia had divided the world, and China could 
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no longer be relied upon as the stabilizing influence in Asia as had been 
earlier hoped. Japan app~ared increasingly to be the most viable possibility 
among major Asian nations of becoming a stable democracy~ strong economy, and 
close ally oi' the West . .American policy moved far from punishment of Japan and 
keeping Japan weak in competition with its neighbors, to regarding Japan as the 
11 workshop of Asia 11 and good friend of the United States. 
The effect of this shift in attitude was increasing emphasis in Occupa­
tion economic policy upon recovery and decreasing emphasis upon reform. The 
land and labor reforms had already been completed, but the break-up of large 
industrial and financial enterprises other than zaibatsu holding companies and 
of their buying and selling interrelationships had really only begun. The 
quite ambitious SCAP industrial reform program was allowed to wither away in 
its implementation, as already noted, since most companies could correctly 
point to retardation of their recovery if they were to be split up or other­
wise disrupted. In a sense the longer-run reform goals gave way to the more 
immediate tasks of recovery. 
In growth rate terms recovery was rapid, but it was from such a low 
1945-1946 base (when output was probably at a level not above that prior to 
World War I! ) that even rapid rates of improvement were insufficient to re­
construct the economy quickly. Not until 1954 or 1955 was Japan able to 
attain prewar per capita levels of productivity, national income and per­
sonal consumption. In crude economic terms Japan lost 18 years of economic 
growth in embarking on its disastrous World War II adventure; it took that 
long to come back up to the prewar level. 
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Thus, Japan was still a very weak country when the Allied nations agreed
in 1951 to end the Occupation and to restore sovereignty to Japan by signing a
peace treaty. Actually General MacArthur had sugg.ested this course as early as
1947. Aside from continuing problems within Japan of reform and recovery, the
increasing intensity of the cold war, the hardening anti-communist position of
the United States, and Russia's unwillingness to agree to a peace treaty were
all factors in the slowness in ending the Occupation. The outbreak of the
Korean War in June 1950 marked a de facto end; American attention focussed on
Korea and SCAP turned over responsibility for domestic affairs to the Japanese
government. It also intensified the American resolve to have a peace treaty
signed, and it pressured its Western and Asian allies to agree. 
The Peace Treaty was signed on September 8, 1951, and went into effect
on April 28, 1952, when Japan was once again (legally at least) an independent
nation. Russia and Communist China refused to participate. Russia and Japan
signed a treaty in 1954, restoring normal, if cool, relations marred by Japan's
tie with the West, and disputes about continuing Russian control over two
small islands just north of Hokkaido and fishing rights in adjacent waters.
China and Japan have not yet normalized relations (as of mid-1968). Other
Asian nations signed the Peace Treaty, but several--notably Burma, Indonesia,
and the Philippines--refused to accept a clause in which they gave up rights
to reparations. An important feature of Japan's foreign policy in Asia in the
1950' s was negotiations with the nations on reparations ; settlements were con-­
eluded in all cases. While the Peace Treaty recognized Japan's residual sover­
eignty over Okinawa and the other Ryukyu islands, and over Iwo Jima and the 
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other Bonin islands, the United States retained the right to occupy and adminis-­
ter them so long as its security requirements necessitated. The Japanese de-­
sire to resume full sovereignty, particularly over Okinawa, has been an in­
creasingly important issue during the 1960 1s. The return of the Bonins in 1968 
did little to resolve the issue. 
The Peace Treaty did not mean that Japan was immediately or automati­
cally accepted back into the community of nations. In 1952 Japan was still 
weak: the standard of living was low (gross national product per capita was 
about $250 dollars),1 still below the prewar level; its foreign trade was far 
below prewar levels yet the needs for imports were and would continue to be 
acute; it had virtually no means of defense from external aggression; it still 
had relatively little self-confidence. It faced a world beset with its own 
postwar adjustment problems, hostile or at best indifferent to Japan. It was 
clear to Japanese leaders that the country needed a sponsor in its inter­
national political, economic, and security relations. A neutralist policy of 
going-it-alone would have been very difficult and probably not very fruitful. 
It was natural, perhaps inevitable under the circumstances, that Japan 
should turn to the United States for this support. The United States was 
anxious to establish an alliance with Japan and willing to support it in the 
international arena; it was clearly the strongest nation in the world; it 
was by far Japan's largest trading partner (almost one-thirs of exports and 
1Measured in 1960 Japanese prices and converted at the official exchange 
rate; as is true of other low-income countries conversion of local currency 
into dollars in terms of real purchasing power would yield a considerably-­
perhaps 50 percent--higher figure. 
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imports, eight times greater than Japan's next trading partner.) Moreover, with 
the strong .American presence in Japan despite the ending of the Occupation, it 
is not clear that Japan really had any other viable alternatives, even though 
Prime Minister Yoshida and the other leaders may not have felt the need for such 
alternatives. It is perhaps in the context of a partnership between an omni­
potent nation and a weak but willing nation that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, 
signed at the same time as the Peace Treaty, should be appraised. Under this 
arrangement the United States guaranteed Japan's security from external attack 
and was allowed to maintain bases and military forces, but not nuclear weapons, 
in Japan. 
In terms of Japan's self-interests, its alliance with the United States 
and the West has paid off handsomely. The United States sponsored Japan's 
entry in 1955 into the United Nations and such affiliates as the International 
Monetary Fund and World Bank, into GATT (the world trade organization), and 
in the early 1960 1 s into OECD. This sponsorship, together with Japan's own 
strenuous efforts, enabled Japan to dissipate, or at least substantially miti­
gate the hostilities and discriminatory measures of other nations. By the 
early 1960's, if not sooner, Japan was recognized and accepted as a major 
nation. 
The economic payoff was perhaps even greater. Japan benefitted from 
U.S. Korean War special procurement dollar expenditures, and from continuing 
access to .America's rapidly growing import market (despite recurrent irritants 
over U.S. textile and other commodity import restrictions), and to the U.S. 
short-term and long-tenn private capital markets. The U.S. security umbrella 
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meant that Japan did not have to devote much of its resources for defense, 
utilizing them instead for growth-producing investment and rising living stan­
dards. 
Of course the alliance with the United States has not been without its 
costs. Japan was committed to following pretty much the U.S. line in inter­
national affairs. Until the late 1950 1 s its trade with China was severely 
restricted, more so than for European nations though less than the American 
total boycott. Japan has not followed the subsequent lead of European nations 
in making long-term export credits available to China, no doubt in large part 
due to American pressure (the American position is that it does not see why 
Japan should have easy, even preferable, access to loan funds if Japan is going 
in effect to relend them to China). 
Most important, as Japan's remarkable economic performance of the 1950's 
continued in the 1960 1 s it no longer remained a weak client needing paternal­
istic U.S. sponsorship. The evolving relative power position of Japan and the 
United States has brought new strains as well as opportunities to the alliance. 
Japan quite naturally has wanted greater independence, and more equal partner­
ship. The nature of Japan's economic performance since the eQd of the Occupa­
tion hence is the next matter for consideration. 
\ 
II. The Economic Miracle: From Reconstruction to Super-fast Growth 
Japan's growth rate of national income between 1946 and 1954 of 10.8 
percent was rapid, but wa~ from the early postwar extremely low base. It 
represented little more than eliminating bottlenecks, restoring partially 
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damaged existing capacity to operation, and returning to prewar levels of pro­
ductivity and per capita income. Similar patterns of reconstruction and rapid 
growth occurred during the same period in Europe, notably in West Germany. 
Once recovery was completed, there seemed to be no reason to expect continued 
rapid growth. Indeed, in a 1956 governmental five-year projection 6.5 percent 
was regarded as the maximum sustainable growth rate. 
In fact the Japanese economy has continued its rapid surge of growth 
right to the present, at a rate far faster than that of virtually any other 
country in the world, communist, democratic, or autocratic. Between 1954 and 
1967 Japanese gross national product (GNP), measured in constant prices to 
adjust for the mild inflationary trend, grew at an average annual rate of 10.1 
percent, almost three times as fast as the growth of the American economy for 
the same period. The power of compound interest is such that in 1967 Japan's 
GNP was 3 1/2 times larger than it was in 1954. This performance is unparal­
leled in history. It brought Japan from a populous but relatively weak nation 
in the mid 1950's to the forefront of world powers by the late 1960 1s. I con­
sider some of the implications of this performance in the next section. First, 
it is desirable to examine the changing structure of the economy,cyclical 
fluctuation, and the causes of the exceptional growth performance. 
The most important change in the structure of production is the rising 
relative share of manufacturing and construction from about 28 percent in the 
early 1950's to 35 percent in the mid 1960 1s, and a concomitant decline in 
agriculture, forestry and fishing from 22 percent to less than 12 percent. 
Yet agricultural performance generally has been very good, certainly better 
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than prewar. Rice remains the single most important crop. Better seeds, more 
fertilizers, and insecticides have raised output, particularly in the 1950's. 
Agriculture is becoming more diversified in response to rising consumer demands 
for vegetables, fruits, dairy products and meat. However, the growth of labor 
productivity in agriculture, while outstanding as compared with most countries, 
has lagged behind the rapid increases in industrial productivity. 
The dominant growth of output and of productivity has occurred in indus­
trial activity--manufacturing, construction, electric and other forms of power, 
and transportation. With this has gone substantial changes in the composition 
of manufacturing output, in response to domestic and export demand and to 
Japan's ability to produce. These changes might be summed up in terms of di­
versification, sophistication, and efficiency. 
Prewar, much of Japan's manufacturing was in cotton and silk textiles, 
though machinery and armaments were of increasing importance in the 1930's. 
By the 1960 1 s Japan had developed an extremely diversified manufacturing sector 
capable of producing almost every product existing in the world (though not 
all efficiently). These ranged from the world's largest ocean tankers, to 
cameras, computers and color television, as well as traditional textiles and 
sundries (souvenir gee-gaws). Particularly rapid growth sectors have included 
iron and steel, chemicals, petro-chemicals, machinery, and consumer durables 
such as television, transistorized this and that, washing machines, refrigera­
tors and, more recently, automobiles. With diversification has come increasing 
sophistication of product, as is obvious from the random sample of items pro­
duced. 
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Japan is not simply a diversified producer of manufactured goods, but on 
the whole a highly efficient producer. It has been able to enhance the quality 
of products while reducing costs. Its technological level is now highly advanced 
in many sectors; in pig iron, shipbuilding, radio receivers and a few other areas 
its technology is pre-eminent. In most highly sophisticated items, however, 
Japan still remains somewhat behind the most advanced technology of the United 
States or Europe. Most Japanese industries are making rapid technological 
strides, while combining labor and capital efficiently, so that their competi­
tive power at home and abroad continues to grow. 
Japanese growth? while rapid, certainly has not been smooth. The post­
war economy has moved ahead in great spurts. Booms have developed which gener­
ate real growth rates---12, 13, 15 percent--that simply cannot be sustained. 
Bottlenecks develop, actual and potential export production is diverted to do­
mestic uses, imports of required industrial materials and other goods increase 
rapidly. The result has inevitably been periodic balance of payments crises. 
The solution has been to temporarily slow down what the Japanese term the :;over­
heated economy11 by means of restrictive monetary (and sometimes fiscal} mea­
sures. As soon as the balance of payments difficulties are resolved, the re­
straints are removed and the resumption of rapid growth encouraged, and achieved, 
once again. 
This cycle has a course of three to four years. While the amplitude of 
fluctuation is great, this is primarily because in boom periods the growth rate 
substantially exceeds the average, rather than because the recession phases are 
severe.. Indeed, not only are the recessions brief--about 12 months--they are 
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very mild: there is only a slowdown in growth, not an absolute decline in out­
put. The slowest growth rate in any postwar year was 2.8 percent (in 1954); 
the simple average of growth rates for recession years 1954, 1958, 1962, and 
1965 is 3.9 percent--better than the average growth rate of the United States 
for the entire period. 
So far it has been impossible to arrive at a· comprehensive explanation 
of the causes of Japan's postwar growth performance which adequately determines 
the relative importance of the major causal factors. Three interrelated sets 
of causes have clearly been of great importance: a large supply of highly 
motivated~ relatively skilled or at least trainable labor for industrial uses; 
a very rapid rate of technological innovation and transformation; and an im­
pressively high rate of capital formation and saving. 
Even prior to World War II Japanese industrialization had not proceeded 
far enough in its absorption of labor to reduce substantially the absolute num­
ber of workers in agriculture from early Meiji levels. Wartime bombing and 
postwar repatriation further swelled the numbers in agriculture. This consti­
tuted an immense stock of labor in relatively low productivity uses; to this 
should be added labor in other areas of low productivity, such as small-scale 
manufacturing, fishing, retailing and other services. Population growth was 
rapid in the early postwar period, but the legalization of abortion (for rea­
sons of economic as well as physical or psychological health) sharply reduced 
the birth rate from the early 1950's. The lagged effect on new entrants on 
the labor force was only beginning to be felt in the mid 1960 1 s. Japan has 
been a country of relatively ample labor supply. 
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Japan's labor force is highly motivated--industrious and hardworking. 
It also is well educated. Nine years education is mandatory; most children go 
on to senior high, and a higher proportion of the age group continue to college 
than in any other country aside from the United States. An important Occupa­
tion reform was to increase the number of colleges and universities, and gener­
ally to stress increased educational opportunities. Educational attainment is 
the most important means for achieving upward social and economic mobility in 
Japan. Most Japanese parents are highly education-conscious, encouraging their 
children to become better educated than their parents, and saving assiduously 
to meet the rising costs of higher education. All this has resulted in a labor 
force which is better trained in general and in specific vocational skills and, 
perhaps equally important, receptive to further learning on the job. This 
improvement in the quality of labor has been substantial, but probably not 
strikingly more so than in other industrial countries. The supply of labor, 
and its improvements in quality, have been supportive, indeed essential fac­
tors for rapid growth, but not the initiating cause. Roughly estimated, ap­
proximately one-quarter of Japan's growth of output can be attributed to the 
combination of increase in labor force and its reallocation from lower to 
higher productivity uses. 
The transfer of labor from agriculture and other low productivity uses 
has been accomplished primarily by the movement of young people when they first 
enter the labor force as school graduates. Only one-tenth of farm children are 
remaining in agriculture, the others migrating to factory and related jobs in 
nearby towns and larger cities. By the mid 196O's large firms, which typically 
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hire only new entrants into the labor force and retain them for their entire work 
life, were complaining of shortages of labor, but this was really only in terms 
of new entrants • There has also been movement among the economically active into 
higher productivity, higher paying jobs. Thus, more than one-half of farm family 
income is derived from non-farm activities; the father works in a nearby factory 
and much of the farming work is done by his parents and his wife. 
One of the most impressive facets of the Japanese performance has been 
the improvement in productivity due to technological innovation. Japanese 
business has been highly innovation-oriented in physical production processes, 
primarily in adopting and adapting techniques that had quick commercial appli­
cation. So far there has been much less emphasis on basic research. This has 
been especially true of foreign technology which has been inducted into Japan 
on a larger and more diverse scale than has ever occurred anywhere. 
Several points stand out about this immense foreign technological in­
flow. First, Japan's increasing isolation from the West after 1937 meant that 
by 1955, when the technological inflow began to assume substantial proportions, 
the gap between Japan's level of technology and the best available in the West 
had widened substantially. Moreover, prewar Japan had not yet reached the 
frontiers of advanced technology in most fields, less so than today. 
Second, probably as important as the technological gap itself has been 
Japan's enhanced capacity to absorb foreign technology on a large scale. By 
the l950's it had the managers, the engineers, the skilled technicians--in 
sufficient quantity and variety--that foreign technology was not overly diffi­
cult to learn about , to learn, and to adapt as well as adopt. This widespread 
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ability has been the cumulation of the long process of development. It probably 
was enhanced by the production requirements of war, and again by certain of the 
postwar reforms. 
Third, foreign technology has been obtained almost entirely by licensing 
arrangements, patent purchase, and technical. tie-ups of Japanese private firms 
with their counterparts abroad. Very little has come in by the route of foreign 
business direct investment in Japan; where that has occurred it usually has been 
in the form of a joint venture between Japanese and foreign firms with manage­
ment often in Japanese hands. Until the late 1950's few foreign firms regarded 
the Japanese market as particularly good relative to the difficulties of doing 
business. The Japanese government has had a consistent policy of opposition to 
foreign direct investment for a variety of reasons: fear of foreign control of 
strategic sectors; concern that Japanese firms in specific industries would be 
outcompeted; concern that foreign firms will not fit into, and indeed possibly 
disrupt, the informal but close relations and controls of government with busi­
ness; an evaluation that royalty and license payments, while expensive, would be 
less than profits which would be made by foreign firms; and plain xenophobia. 
The policy has gradually become less restrictive. The United States and other 
countries have put pressure on Japan to "act like other advanced nations." In ad•­
dition ,as Japan approaches the technological frontier of knowledge in specific 
areas, it has only one foreign company with whom to bargain, rather than the 
several or more firms which control the slightly less advanced technology. This 
foreign firm frequently utilizes its superior bargaining position by requiring 
a share of profits--usually through a joint venture--rather than settling solely 
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for a licensing arrangement. 
Technological innovation has by no means been limited to adoption of 
foreign technology. Much has been the improvement and commercial application 
of Japan's own research and development efforts. Shipbuilding is just one ex­
ample. Japanese shipbuilding firms have become pre-eminent in the world, es­
pecially for immense petroleum and other bulk carriers. Optics--in cameras, 
biD&culars, and electron microscopes--is another field relying heavily on 
domestically-developed technology. Adaptation of a given technology to obtain 
superior performance has been an important factor in enhancing productivity. 
Typically large firms surround a new machine or process with many engineers not 
simply to learn but to make numerous small adjust~ents and improvements. This 
is expensive--engineers aren't all that cheap--but it pays off. One Japanese 
steelmaker was able to produce 3,500 tons from a unit of 2,500 ton rated ca­
pacity. Other examples abound. No overall evaluation exists, but this approach 
ha.s probably led to increases in productivity from 10 to 20 percent above rated 
capacity. 
Two final points should be made about the high rate of technological 
innovation. First, innovation has been concentrated mainly on the physical pro­
duction process. Japanese firms have done much less to reduce overhead costs-­
to improve administrati.on, finance, sales, etc. It may well be that production 
processes, because of their very characteristic of being 11physical 11 and "tech­
nical, 11 somehow made necessary any sorts of adjustments in human responses and 
interpersonal relationships. This is much less true of administrative activi­
ties, where changes may seem to impede much more upon certain established 
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patterns of human relationships and behavior, while the changes in themselves 
may seem less essential. Why minimize the amount of cash balances, when a firm 
thinks in the context of its total relationship to its lending bank? Won't an 
otherwise desirable change in distribution strategy undermine and perhaps even 
bankrupt the entire inefficient network of wholesalers, sub-wholesalers, and 
retailers which has been connected to the firm for so long? It is not surpris­
ing that innovation has come about less rapidly in management than in production. 
Second, innovation has not just meant that a few large firms utilize the 
latest techniques but that modern technology has been dispersed throughout the 
economy. About 40 percent of Japan's total labor force now works with high 
productivity in modern plants using recent equipment and technology. It is this 
widespread improvement in production methods which has resulted in the rapid 
growth rate of aggregate productivity and output in the economy as a whole. 
Both labor force and technological innovation have been closely inter-­
related with the third major cause of Japan's rapid growth--the high rate of 
investment. The increasing production of labor in all uses, the growth of the 
labor force, and the shift of labor to relatively higher productivity uses have 
all required additional amounts of invested capital. Not all, but many, tech­
nological improvements have been embodied in the new machines and other equip­
ment, domestically produced or imported, which constitute an important share of 
investment. Only with a rapid rate of new investment could innovation have been 
so large and pervasive and output per worker increased so much. 
A high proportion of investment has been in business plants and equipment 
and in government fixed investment in transportation and other forms of social 
overhead necessary for growth. Table 1 indicates in the final column just how 
rapid the increase in investment has been. The inevitable consequence has been 
a rising proportion of the economy's output being ploughed back into facilities 
for further growth, as shown in the other columns in Table 1. The share of gross 
domestic investment (private plus public) in GNP went from 25-30 percent in the 
mid 1950's to 35-40 percent in the 1960 1 s. This is the highest rate ever achieved 
for any length of time in peace in a private market-oriented economy, i.e., on 
a voluntary, non-coercive basis. Similarly fixed investment in facilities, ex­
cluding housing, rose from about 18 percent of GNP to 27-30 percent. The most 
rapid growth occurred in the investment boom of 1959-1961. Thereafter the rate 
of growth of investment has levelled off somewhat, but at a significantly higher 
proportion of GNP. 
The overall strategy of growth has been to plough investible funds into 
the expansion of private production facilities in ord.er to increase output as 
rapidly as possible. This strategy provided the ha.sis of policy under the Occu­
pation and has continued since. At the beginning government initiative was 
important in the reconstruction of basic industries. Thereafter investment has 
been increasingly by private business on its own initiative. Thus it is mis­
leading to use the term "strategyn as if it implies a highly centralized de­
cision-making authority with full control over the allocation of resources. 
Although the relationship between government and business is close, with con­
siderably more government influence than in the United States on private business 
decisions regarding production, pricing, new investment in expansion of capacity, 
etc., nonetheless the government has not been able to predict well, or judge in 
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Table 1 
Gross National Product and its Uses 
(based on 1960 constant prices) 
Average
Annual
1952 1957 1962 1967 Rate of
Growth 
Gross National Product 21.4 32.2 52.7 84.7 9.6( $ billion)a 
Used for (in percent of GNP) 
Private Consumption 59.8 57.8 54.3 51.1 8.5
Food, Beverages and Tobacco 31.0 27.9 21.8 
Clothing 7-5 7.7 7.5
Housing Services 7.3 7.0 8.7 
Gross Private Investment 17,5 26.2 27.5 
Plant and Equipment 11.7 16.2 21.2
J Housing 3.1 3,5 4.o 
Inventories 2.7 6.5 2.3 
Government Purchases 19.6 16.1 17.8 15.7 8.1
Consumption 13.2 9.6 8.1 6.9 5.0
Investment 6.4 6.5 9.7 
Fixed 6.o 6.2 9.2 
Inventories 0.1 -0.2 0.1 
Housing 0.3 o.4 o.4 
Net Sales Abroad 3.1
b 
o.o o.4 o.4 -4.4
Exports 10.2 11.1 11.9 14.8 12.4
Imports 7.0 11.1 11.5 14.4 14.9 
a: Converted at the official exchange rate parity o:r 360 yen= $1.
b: Exports minus imports of goods, services, and factor payments. 
Source: Government of Japan, Economic Planning Agency, Annual Report on National
Income Statistics. 1968. 
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detail, much less control, the amount of private investment that will be under­
taken. Policymakers have been surprised to see a higher-than-anticipated surge 
of private investment in productive capacity following each recession. Although 
with favorable impact on growth, the rapid increases in investment have caused 
the unsustainable booms already discussed. Government policy has not succeeded 
in holding back private investment by direct controls or administrative guid­
ance (informal pressure, consultations, backed with veiled threats of more 
serious action). Instead the government has waited until the last moment and 
then applied general restraints through fiscal and monetary policy. In large 
part this slowness to act has been one of lack of will rather than lack of 
means: the government in power always has had a pro-growth bias, and doesn't 
want to {seem to) choke off the boom prematurely. 
All this suggests an economy in which private enterprise has been terri­
bly eager to invest in order to expand productive capacity and output, much more 
so than in other countries. This is essentially correct. It does not have to 
be explained by reference to some exotic form of business behavior peculiar to 
Japan. This investment has paid off--in higher profits and larger-sized firms. 
Businessmen have had very optimistic expectations which have on the whole been 
fulfilled. In a sense it has been self-fulfilling; as many firms in all in­
dustries have tried to grow rapidly they have generated the demands for each 
others' and thereby their own products. Technological innovation, which has 
been so highly oriented to quick commercial application, has indeed paid off 
in profits. Profit rates on new investment rose substantially in the late 
1950's and early 1960 1s; they apparently have receded somewhat since, but new 
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investment still remains profitable in most sectors. 
A further important motivation for large business enterprise has been its 
ranking relative to other firms measured in terms of output or sales. Because 
stock ownership has become so widely distributed, most large business enter­
prises are in fact controlled by management. They cannot be completely imper­
vious to the stockholders, but so long as profits appear adequate management 
has great independence of action. Management apparently does not conceive of 
its role solely to maximize profits but also to enhance, or at least maintain, 
its status in the industry, commonly measured by its relative sales ranking. 
Thus aggressive firms, not quite at the top of the heap,attempt to increase 
market share. This shows up particularly in booms, when some firms race ahead 
in expanding capacity regardless of pressures fr9m the government and other 
firms fo the industry. This competitive spirit is an important reason for the 
high rate of business investment. 
The high rates of investment flows have naturally resulted in a tremendous 
increase in Japan's capital stock. The private sector fixed capital stock more 
than tripled between 1950-1964, while that of the government doubled. Of the 
increase in private fixed capital, 45 percent was in manufacturing, followed 
by 14 percent in agriculture, 11 percent in electricity, gas and water, 9 per­
cent in commerce, and 7 percent in transportation and communications. With the 
much slower rate of growth of population, the a.mount of capital per worker in 
the economy has more than doubled. 
Investment has to be financed out of saving, either that done within the 
economy or by borrowing the savings of foreigners. In Japan the extraordinarily 
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high rate of investment has been matched by an extraordinarily high rate of domestic!' 
saving. Corporate business retains a high proportion of its profits to invest 
in expansion. The government saves large amounts (defined as tax and other 
revenues minus current expenditures for government services) to invest in fa•• 
cilities for transportation, communications, education, and public services. 
One-third of gross saving consists of depreciation funds, generated by the rapid 
investment itself and by favorable depreciation rates. 
Most impressive of all is that one-third of gross saving is done by private 
individuals--wage and salary earners, divident and rent recipients, farmers, and 
owners of unincorporated non-farm enterprises. Even though income levels are 
below those in the West, all groups save a higher proportion of income than in 
other advanced countries. For example, during the 1960's, urban wage earners 
have been saving about 15-20 percent of their disposable income--more than 
twice the savings rate of workers in the United States. Farmers have a some-­
what lower but still significant rate--about 10 percent. Owners of unincor­
porated enterprises have even higher savings rates--on the order of 25--35 per­
cent, 'though the data are poor. 
The relative importance of various factors causing these hi.gh savings 
rates have not been well sorted out yet. Probably the inadequate retirement 
programs of government and business are an important influence', people save 
for their old age. With credit expensive and not readily available, there is 
considerable target saving for housing, purchase of consumer durables, and 
children's education. Small business owners have similar difficulties in bor­
rowing, and have even greater incentive to plough back earnings than in large 
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firms. The wage system of large and increasing semi-annual bonuses probably 
has had an important impact on wage-earners saving. Lurking in the background 
of the explanations is the vaguely-articulated feeling that the Japanese are 
frugal; in one sense a tautology (frugality meaning a high saving rate) it also 
implies something about Japanese preferences for future versus present consump­
tion, the desire to protect against possible future adversities, the desire to 
pass on wealth to children, etc. 
In Japan even more than in most other advanced economies different indi-­
viduals and groups have been doing the saving and the investing. Despite its 
very high savings rate out of profits, corporate business investment has grown 
even more rapidly. This had to be financed from external funds--stock and bond 
issue and borrowings, mainly from financial institutions. Large firms are 
heavily in debt; net worth is only 20 percent of total liabilities. Stock issue 
has constituted only about 5 percent of industrial funds, and bonds even less. 
From management's viewpoint stock issue is expensive because shares is­new are 
sued at par (usually considerably less than the market price) and dividends, 
unlike interest, come from profits after taxes. Bond issue is limited because, 
with interest rates on bonds pegged by government pressure below those on long­
term loans or other competing interest rates, there are few buyers. Commercial 
banks and other financial institutions have filled the gap by extensive lending, 
both long-term and short-term. In turn, individuals tend to hold their savings 
in time deposits and other financial forms. The financial system thus has been 
an efficient and effective intermediary between savers and investors, its allo­
cation of credit has enabled the growth of business investment to occur. 
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There have been a wide variety of other, perhaps lesser, causes of post­
war Japan's outstandingly successful economic performance. The government, as 
already indicated, has placed domestic economic growth at the top of its policy 
objectives. It has relied on private enterprise to produce the goods. The 
government's main role has been: to refrain, whereever possible, from compet­
ing with business for resources--i.e., allowing business first claim on inves­
tible funds for expansion; to aid and encourage business with special tax con­
cessions, loans to "important'' industries, provision of the social overhead 
facilities essential to maintain private production; and to produce optimis·­
tically realistic five-year plans (really projections) which business has taken 
sufficiently seriously to regard as minimum targets (which indeed they have 
turned out to be). Because of the no-war clause (Article 9) in the Constitu­
tion and the security umbrella provided under the arrangements with the United 
States, government expenditures on defense have been negligible, less than 1 
percent of GNP in contrast to the 6 percent in prewar 1934--36. Resources have 
thus been freed for more productive uses, and have so been used. 
Of major importance has been Japan's ability to obtain and pay for the 
imports essential for this growth process. Japan's dense population in a rela­
tively small land space, of which only about 15 percent is arable, means that 
high and increasing levels of GNP per capita can be achieved only by main re­
liance on industrial production. Yet Japan lacks sufficient supplies of the 
basic mineral and plant materials used in industrial production. It has to 
import all, or virtually, of its petroleum, iron ore, bauxite, mineral phos­
phate, cotton, wool, natural rubber, soybeans, 60-80 percent of its coking 
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coal, hides, salt, sugar and wheat, and more than 20 percent (on a caloric 
basis) of all its foodstuffs. Japan, like all nations, imports substantial 
amounts of sophisticated machinery in which other countries have a comparative 
advantage; examples include Boeing 707s, certain kinds of ship engines, and 
specialty steel manufacturing equipment. Virtually all of Japan's imports can 
be regarded as necessities; the importation of consumer manufactured goods is 
a negligible proportion of the total. 
Access to, and the ability to pay for, imports has thus been an extremely 
important objective, nto just in terms of domestic economic policy, but as the 
cornerstone of foreign policy. Japan has achieved this objective remarkably 
well, due both to its own efforts and to favorable changes in the world trading 
environment. World trade has grown more rapidly than ever before in world his­
tory, as world GNP has increased and as trade restrictions have been successive­
ly reduced. Japan benefitted also from the decline in world prices of raw ma­
terials during the 1950's, a decline which saw the price index of Japanese 
imports drop by 20 percent, more than offsetting the 10 percent drop in Japan's 
export prices. 
While importing at a rate considerably more rapid than the world as a 
whole, Japan has succeeded in expanding exports equally rapidly (see Table 1), 
at more than double the world rate. This was essential for Japan to be able 
to pay for its import requirements. 
Japan's superior export performance is attributable to a number of fac­
tors. Japan is a highly export--conscious nation. The government bureaucracy, 
businessmen, and even the general public--indoctrinated with such national 
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slogans as nprosperity through exports and stability through saving1;---are so 
aware of the importance of exports that they have become virtually an end in 
themselves rather than a means of paying for imports. Considerable effort goes 
into analysis, projections, and achievement of export performance. Exports re­
ceive special consideration in the financing of their productive capacity, pro­
duction itself, and sales, in inspections and other controls over quality, in 
legalized formation of production and distribution cartels, and in various 
other, more subtle ways. Basically, exports have done so well because of in­
creased supply capacity resulting from the industrial investment boom; the com­
petitive production of entirely new products; enhanced price competitiveness 
relative to other advanced countries from reducing labor costs per unit of 
output (wage increases have been rapid but productivity gains even more rapid); 
and changes in the composition of Japanese exports from commodities for which 
world demand in trade was growing slowly to those with rapid growth. Typical 
is the relative shift to transistor radios, color television, cameras, and 
automobiles and away from cotton and silk textiles, the prewar mainstays. In 
other cases world demand may be growing less rapidly but Japan has sharply in-­
creased its market share by cost-cutting and capacity-expanding investment with 
technical change; ships, and iron and steel, are the most important examples. 
In the final analysis much of Japan's economic success must be attributed 
to the human factor. Japanese are a highly achieving, energetic, pragmatic 
restless people always on the look-out for new opportunities. The basic at­
titude toward many economic problems is that they can be solved through growth. 
The size of the slice of the pie becomes less important when the pie is rapidly 
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becoming larger. Japanese are willing to work hard, to learn new methods, to 
save for the future, and to undertake the entrepreneurial risks inherent in any 
new production and investment. 
III. The Political Economy and Welfare of Gro,nh 
Super-fast economic growth since the end of the Occupation and reconstruc­
tion has wrought great changes in Japan, changes that continue rapidly and the 
implications of which are only beginning to be understood. In this section, I 
briefly consider living standards, the evolution of Occupation reforms, the 
emergence of a new 11 establishment, 11 and the political system and the government­
business relationship. 
Rapid economic growth has brought a major improvement in family incomes 
and standards of living. The benefits of growth have been widely distributed; 
virtually everyone is substantially better off. This has been accomplished 
mainly by higher wages and better employment opportunities rather than by social 
expenditures, which have remained a small proportion of governmental budgets. 
Thus those who have benefitted least from growth are the ag~d, the widowed, the 
older unskilled day laborer, and other deprived groups who are unable to pro­
vide for themselves fully. Discrimination has probably reduced the benefits 
occurring to Korean residents in Japan and to the outcaste group of Japanese 
(burakumin, or eta). Nonetheless, the improvements have been sufficiently wide­
spread that there are no major groups which feel they have been completely left 
out of Japan's economic progress. 
For the economy as a whole, adjusted for price rises and taxes, disposable 
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income per person1 almost tripled between 1952 and 1966, at a 7.6 percent aver­
age annual rate. It is very difficult to make direct comparisons with disposable
income levels in other countries, since Japanese typically consume somewhat 
different commodities and in different proportions and since the relative prices
between commodities (say fish and refrigerators) vary according to country. The
official exchange rate, which is derived from the relationship between goods im­
ported and exported (a relatively small proportion of total goods and services
in most economies), clearly understates the real purchasing power of money in
almost all countries. For example, Japan's disposable income per capita in 1967
measured at the official exchange rate is $770, Measured in purchasing power
in terms of United States relative prices in 1965 dollars, the per capita dis­
posable income was approximately $1200. This was about four-ninths the U.S.
level, and somewhat less than major European countries aside from Italy. 
Personal consumption has risen rapidly, at a 7,5 percent average annual
rate per capita between 1952 and 1967. As Table l indicates, the share of food
and clothing in total consumption has declined; with higher incomes people have
been able to devote more to recreation, consumer durables, and other discre­
tionary uses. Most household durables are more widely diffused than in Europe.
For example 96 percent of Japan~se homes have television, 78 percent refriger­
ators, 85 percent electric washing machines, and 54 percent vacuum cleaners,
though only 13 percent have an automobile, and 4 percent room air conditioners.
The consumption pattern has been somewhat lopsided in that housing and 
1This is about one-third less than GNP per capita and one-sixth lessthan national income per capita. The main differences are corporate retainedincome, government revenues less transfers to individuals, and (for GNP) de­preciation allowances. Disposable income can either be spent for consump­tion or saved. 
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public amenities, such as urban water supply and sewage systems, better roads, 
prevention of air and water pollution, and solution to problems of urban con­
gestion, have lagged. Thus in some ways urban living has worsened rather than 
improved (for the middle class). This resulted inevitably from the priority 
government and the financial system gave to business investment and, within 
government expenditures, to investment in transportation and other facilities 
which directly supported private production. Metropolitan area housing is ex­
pensive, especially because land costs are high, yet mortgage credit is avail­
able for only a small proportion of the total cost. Hence gaps between the 
supplies of private consumption goods and of public goods relative to their re­
spective demands appeared by the late 1950's and have widened since then. While 
a reallocation of investment reallocation of investment relatively toward 
housing and provision of public services would probably slow down the measured 
growth rate, it would probably also do more to enhance the general welfare. 
Indeed it is not readily apparent why these lags have been tolerated. Perhaps 
the postwar reconstruction syndrome, with its justification of personal sacri­
fices for the sake of growth of output, has continued to be important. The 
demand for public services is not always well articulated in a democratic poli­
tical system. As a consequence of organized interest group pressures, even more 
than in other democracies government policy has focussed on producers rather 
than consumers. Perhaps foreign observers overestimate the extent of demand for 
public goods; individuals in what has been a relatively low income country by 
Western standards may simply prefer private consumption. And no doubt the very 
nature of rapid growth produces such imbalances~ since it is not possible to 
synchronize completely all secotrs of the economy. 
While all family incomes have risen substantially, the equality of income 
distribution has been reduced slightly from early postwar. This has been a 
result more of growth-oriented policies and of changes emanating from growth it­
self than any attempt to undermine the Occupation reform objectives. Certainly 
income distribution appears to be at least as equal as in the United States. A 
variety of forces have tended to reduce equality. The government provided in­
ducements to save, in order to raise the saving rate, by giving favorable tax 
treatment to dividends and interest; this favored the relatively more wealthy. 
It has tolerated systematic understatement of income and profits of small busi­
ness. In its de facto strategy of allowing private business first claim on re­
sources, it has held down its social welfare expenditures (which typically benefit 
the poorest in a society); this is in sharp contrast to postwar Europe and the 
United States. 
In the early l950's older workers, those with longer service, those with 
more education, and those working in larger firms received much higher wages 
than young, low seniority, less educated workers in smaller firms. Since then 
all these differentials have substantially narrowed. This has raised the rela­
tive position of lower income workers. While some of the general rise in wage 
rates (78 percent in real terms between 1953 and 1967) may have been attribu­
table to labor union activity, though this is not at all clear, primarily the 
general increase and the narrowing differential has been due to the rapidly 
growing business demand for labor combined with the practice of large firms of 
hiring only young people. 
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Despite the draining off of labor from agriculture, with concomitant sub­
stitution of small tractors and other capital equipment, labor productivity in 
agriculture has almost inevitably grown less rapidly than in manufacturing. This 
would imply a worsening of the relative income position of farmers. Two things 
have occurred to prevent that. First, the government has allowed the prices of 
agricultural products to rise relative to manufactured good. This was done in 
two ways. The government, which purchases most of the rice crop every year for 
resale to consumers, has responded to farmer political pressure by raising its 
purchase price every year; the purchase price in 1967 was 94 percent above that 
a decade earlier, and was more than double the world trade price. This suggests 
the second mechanism for the increase in prices of agricultural products: to 
protect domestic agriculture and to transfer income to farmers from consumers 
the government has severely restricted the competitive import of foodstuffs. 
As demand for agricultural products--especially fruits, vegetables, dairy prod­
ucts and meat--has gone up with higher incomes and standards of living, supply 
has increased in response, but less rapidly, so that prices have risen. 
The second way in which farmer wealth, if not directly income, has been 
greatly affected has been by the rapid increase in land values, particularly 
near urban areas. Postwar growth has accelerated the rate of urbanization; now 
more than two-thirds of the population live in cities. Metropolitan housing 
has expanded out into agricultural field; so too have factories. In the process, 
the price of urban land increased 925 percent between 1955 and 1967, in con­
trast to a 10 percent rise in the wholesale price index and 60 percent rise in 
consumer price index. Both urban landowners and farmers near cities have become 
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wealthy. Farm land values have risen also because of increased agricultural out­
put (and its price) per unit of land. Only farmers in the hinterlands--far from 
markets and farming hilly, marginal land--have had their land value decline, as 
young potential farmers move instead into urban jobs. One of the unintended 
side effects of the Occupation land reform was to make ex-tenants increasingly 
wealthy as land values have risen. Former landlords have fumed, and organized 
to demand additional government compensation,but the extra amounts they have 
received have not been large. 
Growth has not been without its problems. I have already mentioned the 
lagging growth of housing and public services, particularly in urban areas. 
These have been an important component of the stresses and strains of the urbani­
zation. Another problem has been the persistent rise since 1959 in consumer 
prices of about 5 percent annually. Even though money wages and incomes have 
increased more rapidly, housewives have vociferously protested. The five-year 
economic plans in the 1960 1 s stipulated a maximum increase in consumer prices 
of about 2-3 percent per year, but as the economy has grown more rapidly than 
projected in the plans so too have prices. 
The rise in consumer prices has been mainly in services, agricultural 
commodities, and goods produced by small manufacturers, where wages have risen 
more than productivity. Prices of goods produced by large firms, where pro­
ductivity increases are greatest, have risen only slightly, or in some cases 
actually fallen. Accordingly wholesale prices, and of particular significance 
export prices, have not tended to go up much. Prices of services epitomize the 
situation. For example, it is difficult to increase substantially a barber's 
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productivity: the only ways he can increase his income are to raise pr
ices and 
to reduce quality (no free hairwash and shave). In the process of econ
omic de­
velopment it is natural to have changes in the relative prices of goods
 and ser­
vices as demand and productivity changes occur. In a buoyant, growing 
economy 
with high aggregate demand it is not surprising to find the consumer pr
ice in­
dex rising. 
On the whole the increase in consumer prices has not been all that harm
­
The consumer price rise is due primarily to theful. Real incomes have risen. 
absolutely and relatively increasing wage rates for young, unskilled, l
ow income 
labor. This has tended somewhat to equalize income distribution, at le
ast among 
the lower 60 percent of the population. Deflationary policies to preve
nt con­
sumer price rises would not only have slowed the real rate of economic 
growth 
but would have particularly hit the low income wage earners, whose wage
s would 
have increased much less rapidly. 
While both agriculture and small business in general have prospered-­
though not without their own difficulties--what has prospered most of a
ll has 
been big business, finance and commerce. Their rate of new investment 
and 
technological innovation has been more rapid, their share in output has
 been 
rising, and their power in society increasing. Japan is as much a big 
business 
society today as it has ever been. 
Big business has close and extremely complex relationships with the 
central government bureauracy and with the Liberal-Democratic Party (LD
P), 
the conservative political party in power. Government is much more inv
olved 
in business decision-making than in most other private enterprise, mark
et 
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economies. Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) officials keep 
in virtually daily contact with large firms. MITI tries to assist large firms 
in a variety of ways; in exchange it applies informal pressures (termed "adminis­
trative guidance11 ) to reduce 11 excessiveiV or 11wasteful11 competition among firms, 
to synchronize new capacity expansion programs among firms and industries in 
line with stable growth and other objectives, to arrange cartels to prevent 
;;excessive11 price declines in recessions, etc. Ministry of Finance (MoF) and 
Bank of Japan (BoJ) officials are in daily contact with the major commercial 
banks. Politicians serve, as one of their functions, as brokers between busi­
ness and the government bureaucracy. There has been a high degree of consensus 
at the general level among businessmen, government bureaucrats, and the LDP 
politicians. The slogan 11what is good for the country is good for Mitsubishi, 
and vice-versa" is quite, if not completely, operative. 
At times, of course, conflicts do arise: the government bureaucrats want 
businessmen to toe the line more than they are willing, or certain industries 
want favors which bureaucrats feel are not in the national interest. The pro­
cess by which conflicts are resolved is not well understood, nor is it clear 
whether government dominates business or business dominates government, The 
LDP and its party leaders rely heavily on financing from big business; they 
control the government bureaucracy but also need its expertise for advice and 
implementation. The bureaucracy has strong legal and extra-legal ( 11 guidance") 
powers over business. However, bureaucrats retire early (typically at age 55); 
many move into high, plush positions in large firms with which they formally 
dealt. The three-way interplay is subtle and not well known; which comes out 
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ahead depends very much on the specific issue and its context at the time. 
The interrelationships among big businesses, and among business, govern­
ment bureaucracy and LDP politicians are rather close, personal and informal. 
In the Japanese meritocracy--where social mobility is achieved in large part 
through education, and where the more prestigious the university (and diffi­
cult to pass the entrance examination) the greater the chance of being hired 
by big business or government ministry, and eventually succeeding in politics-­
most of the senior government and business officials, and many politicians, 
are bound by school ties that are close and important. Graduates of the same 
university have a special call on each other; this call is intensified where 
they were classmates, or studied under the same professor. These ties are re­
inforced by intermarriage among families. 
All this has led observers to speak of a Japanese 11Establishment"--500, 
or 2,000 or some other number of important individuals who, on the basis of 
their business, government and/or political affiliation, and common education 
and acquaintanceship, make the important decisions for Japan. There is some­
thing to this appraisal, but it is difficult to know how much. In fact the 
groupings are somewhat diffuse and pluralistic; this shows up particularly in 
the case of specific issues. There does not seem to be such a fully cohesive, 
unified, elite Establishment that can and does determine all major decisions. 
What has prevented such an overwhelming, monolithic establishment from 
emerging? Three interrelated factors are important. First, the specific 
interests of various groups differ, and at times are in conflict, when con­
crete issues arise. I have noted already that this occurs among the three 
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major groups: big business, LDP politicians, and central government bureaucrats. 
It also occurs within each group. Second, pressures which help influence and 
shape policy decisions emanate from outside--the opposition political parties, 
unions, small business, farmers, the intellectuals. Third, while Japan is a 
group-oriented society with emphasis on harmony, consensus, and cooperation, 
at the same time the Japanese people are highly competitive. 
Business, government bureaucracy, and society generally, have tried to 
reconcile the inconsistent elements between competition and cooperation in vari­
ous ways. Young college graduates entering a large firm or government ministry 
compete intensively, yet on a friendly basis, with other new entrants--but do 
not compete with slightly older persons who entered earlier. All will advance 
at least to a middle level, over 10-15 years, on virtually a straight seniority 
basis; a younger person will virtually never be promoted over the head of some­
one older. But within his group (referred to as the 11 entering class") an indi­
vidual strives to be best. His rewards are not faster promotion and higher 
salaries, but are more interesting and influential jobs, and the opportunity 
to be promoted eventually into the ranks of top management. The individual 
working in a large firm seldom quits to move to a new firm (unless it is an 
affiliate); his idenitty with his original hirer is strong and pervasive; he 
views the organization as both fighting and cooperating with the world. 
The firm acts the same way. It is highly competitive with other firms 
in the same industry. It places great value on enhancing, or at least main­
taining, market share and its size ranking in the industry, as already noted. 
At the same time firms are willing to cooperate, when it seems mutually 
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beneficial, with their rivals in the same industry: in dealing with other in­
dustries, with the government, or with foreign competition at home or abroad. 
Firms are more likely to cooperate, in cartel arrangements, in recession periods 
of stress. They agree to restrict production in order to keep prices from de­
clining too much, and perhaps to restrict new investment. Yet even then coopera­
tion does not always win over competition. Of anti-recession cartels estab­
lished (typically with MITI's encouragement and blessing) only about one-third 
have effectively restricted production and maintained prices, for another thirQ 
the results are ambiguous, and in the remaining third firms in fact did not ad­
here to the agreements restricting output, so that prices fell and the cartels 
were a failure. During booms firms are less likely to cooperate so much with 
each other. Aggressive firms, not quite at the top of the heap, hope to in­
crease market share. They are unwilling to participate in industry-wide agree­
ments to coordinate and limit the overall expansion of capacity (according to 
some fixed rate of new investment based on historic relative size of firm) to 
anticipated future total market size on the grounds that they would thereby 
be locked into their present relative position. 
Another reason for lack of overall business unity is that on many issues 
various industries have interests that fundamentally conflict with each other. 
For example, certain industries want to import cheap machinery, or intermediate 
goods, while Japanese producers of these goods quite naturally dislike such 
foreign competition. Similar conflicts exist within purely domestic markets. 
There are also conflicts between big business and small, and between business 
(which would like large imports of cheap food to hold down prices and union 
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demands for wage increases) and agriculture. 
A further source of conflict within the big business sector is the re­
emergence and strengthening of competing business 11groups 11 encompassing affili­
ated firms in mining, manufacturing, commerce and finance. Superficially these 
appear suspiciously like the prewar zaibatsu, and indeed some of the groups 
have familiar names: Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, (but Fuji instead of its 
Yasuda predecessor). Group member firms buy from, sell to, and finance each 
other; members jointly participate in establishing new enterprises in newly de­
veloping fields. The groups vigorously compete with each other across a wide 
range of industrial sectors. 
A group differs significantly from a prewar zaibatsu in that a single 
family no longer owns or otherwise controls, no centralized holding company 
exists, stock ownership is widely diffused, and control is typically in the 
hands of management. Consequently each firm is immeasurably more independent 
than in the prewar case. Decisions are not made from a single, higher author­
ity. The presidents of the main firms in the group meet regularly to solve 
problems of mutual concern; similar arrangements exist for lower staff levels. 
Conflicts among firms are not easily resolved. Often an arbitration committee 
is established usually chaired by the head of the bank in the group. It tries 
to reach a reasonable compromise; otherwise a discontented firm might consider 
pulling out of the group. This is of course more true of those firms more et 
the periphery than the core of the group. 
Similar pluralistic features are characteristic of the government bureau­
cracy and the political parties. Government ministries have a tradition of 
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conside~able autonomy and independence of views, and are jealous of their powers. 
Different ministries frequently have quite different views on specific policies, 
deriving from a complex of different goals, ways of thinking, and perceptions 
of what their respective constituencies are, together with needs of these con­
stituencies. For example, the Bank of Japan appears to place considerable em­
phasis on price stability, the l.finistry of Finance on the restraint of budgetary 
expenditures to the level of revenues, MITI on expansion of industrial produc­
tion and improvement in productivity, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 
en improvement of agricultural incomes (by expansion of production, restriction 
of ir:iports and hisher prices to farmers), and the Economic Planning Agency on 
stable growth and efficient resource allocation. Not surprisingly ministries 
are often e,t loggerheads. Even within ministries there are different groups-­
often based on personalities and internal politics as well as on alternative 
views on policy. For example, MITI is often regarded as monolithically pro­
tectionist end favoring dirigisme, cartels, and industrial concentration and 
planning; yet one group within MITI view the virtues of relatively free, mar­
ket-oriented competition in increasing output and quality, improving productive 
efficiency, ond holding dmm prices as more than compensating for the costs of 
possible excess capacity and other alleged costs of "excess competition." 
The plurnlisn of the Liberal-Democratic Party derives in large part from 
its division into a series of competing factions, which combine and recombine 
with each other in order to achieve and maintain power: the holding of the 
party presidency and hence prime ministership, and of important party offices 
and Cabinet posts. The factions share a common overall ideological and policy 
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framework (alignment with the United States, the emphasis on economic growth in 
domestic and foreign policy) , while differing somewhat on certain specific issuc;s. 
Factions have fomed around leaders based on personality, long personal ties, and 
the ability of the leader to obtain funds to finance the election campaigns and 
ether activities of members of the faction. In addition to heavy contributions 
to the LDP and its central fund-raising organization, many big enterprises make 
contributions to selected specific factions or individuals. Thus, competition 
among industries or business groups, and among LDP factions, tend to spill over 
and reinforce each other. 
Yet the LDP is not simply the captive of big business--it cannot afford to 
be. While much of its financing comes from large business contributions it must 
seek elsewhere for sufficient votes to remain in power. Thus, it has to shape 
policies so as to help, or at least ameliorate conditions for farmers, small 
businessmen, white collar workers, professionals, and workers (particularly 
those who are not militantly organized by unions). Moreover, while retaining 
control of the parliament, the LDP has to provide reasonable alternatives to 
the policy positions of the opposition parties. 
While business is tied to the LDP, unions and their member workers in 
larger enterprises have consistently supported the parties to the left. SOHYO 
(General Council of Trade Unions), the largest labor confederation, has been 
the mainstay of the largest opposition party, the Japan Socialist Party. (The 
JSP too is split into factions; they are based both on personalities and ide­
ology). More middle-of-the-road unions support the moderate Democratic Social­
ist Party, while a few more extreme unions support the small Japan Communist 
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Party. Komeito (Clean Government Party) is the political organ of Sokka Gakkai, 
a fundamentalist Buddhist sect which has grown considerably in the past decade. 
Its supporters belong to no clearly identifiable organized economic group; gen­
erally they are urban, relatively lower income, working in small establishments 
or housewives, somewhat alienated. 
All this suggests that the Japanese economic and business environment has 
evolved in ways considerably at variance from that envisaged by the SCAP re­
formers. The main differences lie in only partial acceptance of competition, 
and relatively greater acceptance of direct government influence on business 
decisions. Anti-monopoly provisions were substantially weakened soon after the 
end of the Occupation, and have eroded further since then, though LDP attempts 
at further legislative easing in the late 1950's and early 1960's were blocked 
by widespread opposition. Nonetheless, interlocking directorships and stock 
ownership is once more permitted. More important, anti-recession production 
and other cartels have been made legal, subject to MITI and the Fair Trade Com­
mission. The latter has been relatively weak, unable really to restrain the 
trends toward restriction of competition. 
Concomitantly, there has been a gradual trend in many industries of in­
creasing concentration of production to a relatively small number of large 
firms. Following the SCAP deconcentration efforts, Japanese industry in the 
1950's was certainly less concentrated than prewar, and no more concentrated 
than in the United States. Concentration was even lessened somewhat by the 
rapid growth of new firms. Since the late 1950's however, the trend has re­
versed: the top three, five or ten firms are gaining an increasing share of 
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total output. Since the mid 1960 1 s the tendency has accelerated due to the 
increasing number of mergers among large firms in major industries. This trend,
together with the growth of groups of affiliated firms, suggests an increasing
concentration of economic power--though far less than that of the 1930 1s. 
Two factors mitigate the adverse effects of increasing concentration of 
the industrial structure. First, intense competition persists among firms in 
a given industry, and among groups. This is reflected in rather substantial 
changes in the relative ranking of the top ten firms in any industry. Second, 
where the government has tolerated or encouraged restrictions of competition, 
it has put pressure on firms to improve productivity, cut costs, and reduce-­
or at least not increase-•-prices. This has been possible because increasing 
concentration has been a consequence in part of economies of very large-scale 
production. 
IV. The Future 
The Japanese phoenix, revitalized and stronger than ever, has soared high.
Can it continue to fly so well? Which way will it fly? Phrased more prosaically,
will Japan's economic growth continue unabated? Will the primacy of economic 
growth in domestic and foreign policy objectives persist, or will new goals be­
come more important? 
It is beyond the scope (or length) of this essay to analyze these questions
in detail. The odds are high (perhaps 70 percent) that the economy will continue
to grow over the coming decade at an average annual rate of at least 6-8 per­
cent, probably somewhat slower than the past decade's super-performance. 
Investment and savings rates will remain a high proportion of GNP, though not
increasing as in the past. Foreign technological inflow will continue; even
though much of the cream has been skimmed. Domestic innovation, and particularly
the diffusion of advanced technology among a larger number of firms and pro­
portion of the labor force, will become relatively more important. Labor supply,
while tightening, will remain more ample than in Europe, particularly as the
institutional practices of large firms hiring only new school graduates and re­
tiring employees at 55 erode. Agriculture will constitute a major problem area,
but its relative importance--now less than 20 percent of labor force and 12 per­
cent of GNP--will continue to diminish. 
While the predominant share of this growth in output and incomes will be
used to increase private consumption and to provide the investment fuel for
further sustained growth, a rising margin will be available for other uses.
These resources are likely to be allocated to the improvement of housing, roads,
water and sewage systems, and other public services. 
Japan's resurgence to the forefront of world industrial nations--third now
in total GNP behind the United States and Russia, though considerably lower in
per capita ranking--has given the people a renewed self-confidence and national
pride. Yet Japan's international political influence, its ranking as a world
power, lag behind. Moreover, to many Japanese it appears that the country does
not have sufficient independence. In part this lies in the earlier realities
of the bi-polar cold war, when Japan as a weak nation quite naturally aligned
itself with the United States and relied upon the .American nuclear umbrella to
provide Japan's security from external aggression. Thus, there is under way 
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some questioning of the single-minded emphasis on economic growth, and the ask­
ing of new questions (for the postwar period). What should be Japan's future 
world role? How can greater independence be achieved, and at the same time 
national security guaranteed? 
No consensus is yet discernible in the emerging debate on these and re­
lated issues. In rather cautious ways the government has tried to develop a 
somewhat more positive foreign policy, particularly in the economic sphere. 
It has substantially increased its economic aid to less developed countries, 
particularly in Asia. It has attempted to mediate in various disputes, par­
ticularly among Asian nations, so far without notable success. 
The issue of national security most starkly delineates these new develop­
ments within Japan. The issue is in flux still, with neither goals nor means 
of achieving them fully articulated. The extremely strong pacifist feeling, 
a continuing consequence of World War II, remains an important factor, though 
apparently affecting the postwar young generation less than those who went 
through the war. Several alternative approaches are under debate. One, the 
policy of the LDP, is to maintain the present military alliance with the United 
States, while obtaining greater independence from U.S. controls on smaller mat­
ters, and redefining the Japan-U.S. partnership in more equal terms. This 
would allow Japan to use its resources for domestic growth and foreign aid and 
investment. But will it be independent enough? How independent can a nation 
be in today's world? And bow about the U.S. cornmitment--how will American 
post-Vietnam security policy evolve? 
The Japan Socialist Party has taken a completely different position: 
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neutralism without military power. Japan should align itself with no bloc, but 
be friendly with all nations. No one will want to attack Japan, so it is not 
necessary to have a defensive military force. Security can be guaranteed by an 
international pact signed by the United States, Russia, and China. Yet there 
seems no evidence that such a pact is feasible. More important, is Japan wil­
ling to lie defenseless, depending solely on the good will of other nations? 
Isn't the risk too high for Japan's own national interests? 
A third alternative--neutralism with security guaranteed by Japan's own 
military forces--has a strong {though by no means overwhelming) logic. It 
however has not yet really entered the debate because a major premise is that 
Japan would have its own nuclear armaments. This at present remains anathema 
to most Japanese. Nonetheless, if Japanese nationalism takes the path of com­
plete independence (and semi-isolationism), and if some external threat to 
Japan's security is clearly and strongly perceived, it is quite possible that 
this alternative could evolve from the positions of either the left or the 
right. As it happens, atomic weaponing and delivery systems are well within 
Japan's technical and economic capacity. Policymakers have kept the choices 
open, pushing the development of atomic energy for peaceful uses, and the 
development of missiles and guidance systems for basic space research. An 
allocation of perhaps 5 percent of GNP per year for five years should provide 
Japan a moderately sophisticated nuclear weapons system. This could be where 
the extra margin of resources from growth will go. 
Japan's single-minded and highly successful pursuit, since the end of 
World War II, of economic reconstruction and growth of production and improve-
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ment in living standards is clear and noteworthy. It seems unlikely that Japan's 
future goals will be so overwhelmingly dominated by economic growth. But to 
what extent will economic objectives--growth, greater social welfare, improve­
ment of public services--continue to be predominant? Or will the nation in­
creasingly seek other goals? If so, how will it try to achieve them? These 
issues make Japan an exciting and important country to watch in the coming cru­
cial decade. 
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